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Abstract. The standard paradigm when securing networks is to filter ingress
traffic to the domain to be protected. Even though many tools and techniques
have been developed and employed over the recent years for this purpose, we are
still far from having secure networks. In this work, we propose a paradigm shift
on the way we secure networks, by investigating whether it would not be efficient
to filter egress traffic as well. The main benefit of this approach is the possibility
to mitigate malicious activities before they reach the Internet. To evaluate our pro-
posal, we have developed a prototype and conducted experiments using NetFlow
data from the University of Twente.
1 Introduction
When it comes to protecting their networks, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and busi-
nesses employ a large set of specialized tools aiming at mitigate attacks targeting their
networks. Examples of such tools include network firewalls, Network Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (NIDS), antivirus, web proxies, and mail filters. Stills, we are far from
having secure networks. To better illustrate this, take as example one of the largest se-
curity threats on the Internet nowadays: botnets [1]. By definition, a botnet is a network
of compromised hosts (also known as bots/zombies) controlled by a botmaster, via a
Command and Control (C&C) channel. They are used for different purposes, such as
phishing, malware propagation, distributed denial of service (DDoS), and spamming. It
is estimated 85% of the more than 100 billion daily spam messages are sent by bots [2].
Behind the current security problems, there might be a subtle defense approach de-
cision: ISPs and businesses usually focus on protecting their own network from the
outside world, filtering mostly ingress traffic. However, little attention is usually given
to egress traffic, meaning that malicious traffic find little or no barrier to leave the orig-
inating domain. One example is spam – most companies filter heavily incoming mail,
but usually they do not much when their own users spam other domains. Due to that,
by the time a security event is detected, it has already taken its own share from routers,
network links and computers that it had to go through to reach its final target, imposing
direct and indirect costs.
This left us wondering if it would not be the case of changing the paradigm on
how we secure our networks, filtering egress traffic as well. Thus, this leads us to the
following research question: what can be achieved by filtering egress traffic from a
particular domain? – that is, why not “clean your house before looking for dirty at
other’s houses?”
Some research works suggest that is worth doing. Van Eeten et al., for example, have
shown that 10 ISPs account for 30% of unique IP addresses sending spam worldwide
[3]. According to that, by filtering outgoing mail from only 10 ISPs, we could reduce
almost one third of all spam. In another work, de Vries et al. [4] have shown that egress
mail traffic can be easily filtered with higher detection rates.
In order to filter egress traffic, many sources of data can be employed, such as mail
server logs, network traces, DNS blacklists. In this work we propose the use of flow
records [5]. The main advantage is scalability, since flow records provide summarized
information about the network traffic, thus coping much better with cfurrent high speed
multi-gigabit lines. Besides that, by using flows records, the communication patterns in
a network can be evaluated instead of having to process the content of each packet [6].
Finally, flows records are application independent, so they can potentially be used to
detect and block any type of malicious activity in the network.
To analyze flow records, in this work we employ cluster analysis, since it is a unsu-
pervised learning technique that does not require a priori knowledge about malicious
communication patterns (in contrast to signature-based NIDS). The assumption is that
we can detect different types of malicious traffic using flow records and cluster analy-
sis. To prove technical feasibility of our proposal, we have developed a prototype and
conducted an evaluation on network flows obtained from the University of Twente.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background infor-
mation and introduces the architecture proposed for detecting intra-domain malicious
hosts. Next, Section 3 details the clustering algorithms employed. After that, Section
4 covers the experiments and the results obtained. Next, Section 5 presents the related
work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and proposes future work.
2 Intra-domain Malicious Hosts Detection Architecture
Figure 1 shows the proposed architecture for detecting intra-domain malicious hosts. In
this figure, NetFlow-enabled routers export flow records to a NetFlow collector. After
some processing, this information is stored on a relational database and fed into the
Anomaly Detection Engines (step 1 – in between parentheses – in the same figure)
which are responsible for analyzing the input data. A broad range of attacks can be
analyzed such as DDoS, port scan and spamming.
In this work we evaluate flow records from spamming hosts to detect malicious
activities within our domain. Since botnets are well used for spamming [7], we aim
to find bots by looking at group of hosts having similar communication patterns with
some of them involved in spamming activity. In this way, detecting spammers helps to
figure out entirely botnet related traffic (C&C as well as other malicious activities). To
do that, we first obtain a list of hosts that have contacted more servers (step 2 in Figure
1). Then, we remove from this list IP addresses from legitimate mail servers from our
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Fig. 1: Intra-domain malicious hosts detection architecture
domain (step 3). Next, hosts sending many more emails than others are considered as
potential spammers (step 4). More details on how spamming hosts are detected are
described on Section 3.1.
After obtaining a list of spamming hosts, we compute the following aggregated
metrics (obtained from Botminer [8]) for all flows:
– the average number of individual flows per hour (fph)
– the average number of packets per flow (ppf )
– the average number of bytes per packet (bpp)
In the end, for each flow we have the following tuple: <source IP address, desti-
nation IP address, destination UDP/TCP port, fph, ppf, bpp>. The idea behind these
metrics (step 5) is that they allow to easily compare flow records from different hosts
in order to find shared communication patterns (step 6). For example, if messages sent
by a bot master reach two different hosts in our network, it is expected that they have
similar properties, such as similar number of packets and bytes. In the same way, bots
from a peer-to-peer botnet should exhibit similar communications to route the messages
and to maintain the coherency of routing tables when nodes join or leave the network.
Once these agglomerative metrics are computed, the next step is to compare such
metrics for flows related to hosts exhibiting abnormal activities in order to cluster them
(step 6). Thus, in step 6, clustering is leveraged for discovering such shared commu-
nication patterns. It is important to note that it is applied on flows and not on hosts. It
means that it also helps to distinguish the malicious traffic pattern from the benign ones
for a single host.
The advantages in here is by doing that we reduce the number of flows to be an-
alyzed. Then, we extend the cluster to other flows (step 7) by comparing them with
flows related to suspect hosts, reducing the overall complexity of the algorithm. Finally,
a score is computed (step 8) for each cluster based on the similarity of flows within it
and the number of hosts it contains which are tagged as suspicious. Hosts as source of
Netflow included in highly scored clusters are declared as malicious (step 9).
3 Detection Algorithms
3.1 Top Email Senders
As described in the previous section, on step 2 in Figure 1, we have to find a list of
spamming hosts. After listing all hosts that have connections to mail servers outside our
domain (machines have outgoing TCP connections on port 25), we remove legitimate IP
addresses of legitimate mail servers from UT (step 3). Finally, we compute two metrics
for each remaining host:
– ni: the number of mail flows records per the host i,
– bi: the total volume of email data sent per host i (in bytes).
The idea behind combining these metrics for evaluation is that we can detect both
hosts contacting many different mail servers and hosts sending too much mail data
(specially related with spam campaigns that include attachments, such as PDF files).
A more complex approach to detect spam using flow records was proposed by Vliek
et al. [9]. However, in our case we employ a faster and simpler approach because the
output is the list of potential spammers for which no decision have to be taken and so
can include benign hosts which will be discarded afterwards.
Therefore, a host is considered as a spamming one if the number of emails and
bytes sent is higher than the observed average. This margin is expressed as a multiple
of the standard deviation. Considering all hosts, the average number of emails sent by
an individual host is avgn and the corresponding standard deviation is stdn. In the same
way, avgb and stdb refer to the number of bytes. i is a spamming host if:
(ni > avgn+σstdn) or (bi > avgb+ γstdb) (1)
In this paper, γ and σ are set to 3. The corresponding hosts form the set S which is
constructed in a linear time (iteration over all email senders).
3.2 Email Senders Clustering
Before starting the clustering algorithm, we obtain from the Netflow data the follow-
ing tuple for each single flow: <source IP address, destination IP address, destination
UDP/TCP port>. After that, we divide this set into two subsets: Fs, a subset that con-
tains all the flows related to the spamming hosts identified in the previous step and Fa,
that contains all the remaining flows from the other machines. Then, we compute for
each flow f ∈ {Fs∪Fa} the metrics introduced in section 2 ( f ph f , pp f f , and bpp f ).
In order to reduce the computational complexity, the first clustering process focuses
on the suspect IP addresses (potential spammers) and creates clusters containing aggre-
gated flow information from Fs. Without any prior knowledge, unsupervised clustering
is required. Besides, there is no assumption about the shape of clusters (following a cer-
tain distribution) and that is why nearest neighbor clustering [10] is fitted in our case.
Hence, the goal is to find similar communication patterns involving multiple suspect
hosts.
Nearest neighbor clustering assumes that two data points belong to the same cluster
if the distance, dist(d1,d2), between them is lower than the threshold θ. Regarding
our context, each data point represents a tuple f as a vector [ f ph f , pp f f ,bpp f ]. After
normalizing the values, we applied the usual Euclidean distance on the vectors.
The algorithm iterates over all fi of Fs and compute dist( fi, f j) for all f j ∈Fs and f j 6=
fi. The pairs of points which the resulting distance is lower than θ are aggregated into
one cluster. If the aggregated points were prior assigned to another clusters, all points
belonging to them are also aggregated (merging). The result is a set of clustersC.
Like many unsupervised algorithm, computing the distance between each pair of
data points is needed which implies a quadratic complexity. Thus, this clustering pro-
cess is only applied to a limited subset of points which were previously selected and
form the set Fs.
3.3 Extending Clusters
Assuming K clusters, C = {c1, . . . ,cK}, the assignation list is A = {a1, . . . ,a|Fs|} such
that ai = c j if the flow fi ∈ Fs is assigned to the cluster c j. Each remaining non suspect
point is assigned to the closest cluster. However, if this distance is too high, the point is
not assigned and is directly considered as a benign host. They are represented by points
outside of clusters in Figure 2a which shows a toy example in two dimensions. There
are a first set of initial clusters constructed in the previous step and then the clusters are
extended.
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Fig. 2: Clustering algorithms on a toy example
The distance between a new point to assign and a cluster is the minimal distance
between this point and any point of the cluster. The assignation list denoted A′ =
{a′1, . . . ,a′|Fa|} is defined as follows:
a′i =
{
ak i f fk = argmin
f j∈Fs
dist( fi, f j) and dist( fi, fk)< θ′
unassigned else
(2)
From a computational point of view, the distance between each non suspect data point
and suspect data points have to be computed. It is equivalent to |Fs| × |Fa| iterations.
Considering the quadratic complexity of the constructions of clusters in the previous
step, the total number of iterations is |Fs|× (|Fs|+ |Fa|) whereas naive clustering of all
flows would have led to (|Fs|+ |Fa|)2 iterations.
3.4 Scoring
Once clusters are created, the goal is to identify those containing hosts with higher
probability of being malicious. Since our approach relies on the malicious activities and
the similar communication patterns of the malicious hosts, a score is assigned to each
cluster based on these criteria. Thus, a cluster with many hosts presenting malicious
activities is highly scored. In brief, the first component of score named score anomalyi
represents the proportion of hosts related to malicious activities in the cluster ci:
score anomalyi =
|{ f j ∈ Fs,a j = ci|}
|{ f j ∈ Fs,a j = ci|}+ |{ fk ∈ Fs,ak = ci|} (3)
The other component of the global score considers also the similarity among the
flow information containing in the cluster. Basically, if the distances between the points
of a cluster are very low, the score is very high. This can be regarded as the width of
the cluster which is the maximal distance between two points of the cluster as shown in
figure 2b. The computation of the width can be long since clusters should contain hun-
dreds or thousands of points and computing all pair-wise distance is quadratic. There-
fore, we propose a simple method inspired from grid clustering techniques [11] where
each cluster is represented as a squared cell like in the toy example in figure 2b. Only
one iteration per point is needed to compute the coordinate of the cell since the goal is
to find the maximal and minimal value for each dimension (two in the toy example and
three in our context). Assuming the cluster ci, the similarity score is defined:
score simi = dist(FMini,FMaxi) (4)
where FMini and FMaxi are fictive points containing minimal and maximal values for
f ph f , pp f f and bpp f subject to f assigned to ci. For example, the first feature of FMin
is:
min
{ f j∈Fs,a j=ci}∪{ f j∈Fa,a′j=ci}
f ph f j
Since, the iterations have only to cover each point one time, the complexity is O(n)
where n is the number of points in a cluster. Traditional methods have to compute pair-
wise distances for extracting then the minimal, maximal or the average one. Unlike our
method, the complexity is O(n2).
Finally, the global score of the cluster ci is the usual mean of both scores:
Si =
score anomalyi+ score simi
2
(5)
If the score is higher than the threshold ψ, all source IP addresses related to the
cluster are considered as malicious. It includes spamming hosts as well as other ones
thanks to the cluster extension process.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we describe the evaluation conducted to prove technical feasibility of our
proposal. As describe in Figure 1, the first step is to obtain NetFlow data from external
data sources. For this experiment, we have obtained two NetFlow datasets from the
University of Twente (a /16 network):
– Dataset A: 1 hour of flow records (April 10th, 2010, from 5:00 PM to 6:00 PM
CEST) – a total of more than 12 million records;
– Dataset B: 2 hours of flow records (April 10th, 2010, from 3:00 PM to 5:00 PM
CEST) – more than 24 million records.
Dataset A was used in the anomaly detection engine in Figure 1, while the dataset
B was used in the host clustering engine. Next we present the detection results and the
validation.
4.1 Malicious Host Detection
After obtaining the aforementioned datasets, we analyze the first one (A) to find hosts
that have contacted more mail servers outside of our domain (steps 2 and 3 in Figure
1). Then, we removed legitimated mail servers from this list, and two hosts have been
automatically selected to be fed into the host clustering engine. The first host was tagged
as suspicious since it has contacted 45 distinct mail servers outside our domain (some
of them more than one time) within one hour, in a total of 250 flow records. Thus, we
can assume that at least 250 accounts were target. The other host tagged as suspicious
has contacted 12 distinct mail servers in a total of 12 flow records.
Next, we have computed the metrics defined in Section 2 for the dataset B (step 5).
In the end, we had 5,424,333 entries in the metrics table with the following format: IP
source/destination, destination port, fph, ppf, and bpp. It is important to emphasize that
we have computed these metrics for not only mail flow records, but all flow records. By
doing that, our algorithm is suitable detecting common communication patterns and not
only spam. So even, it helps to distinguish potential C&C flows from other ones even if
there are few hosts.
In step 6 and 7, two level clustering is applied on the metrics obtained in the previous
step, regard the parameter θ. We assume that θ = θ′ (the similarity within a cluster
has to be same when comparing spamming hosts or any other hosts). Therefore, when
θ increases, more points are grouped within each cluster and so the total number of
clusters decreases. This is shown in Figures 3a and 3b where each cluster is represented
by two points (the score and the size equivalent to the number of distinct source IP
addresses among all flows of the cluster). The x-axis represents only an arbitrary cluster
index but also indicates the total number of clusters which is the maximal index.
In Figure 3a, there are two main groups of clusters. Firstly, many clusters have
a very low scores. They represents normal group of IP addresses which the under-
ling applications exhibit different patterns. Secondly, there are many clusters with high
score (> 0.5). In fact, the corresponding sizes are very low (one or two IP addresses).
Therefore, the high score is only due to the bias introduced by the anomaly score
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Fig. 3: Cluster construction
(score anomaly) equal 1. Indeed, such clusters may easily contain 100% of flows re-
lated to potential spammers since they contain only one or two IP addresses. That is
why these clusters are discarded for further analysis. However, there is a third group of
outlier scores below 0.1 between these extrema.
In order to figure out them easily, θ is increased in Figure 3b to merge clusters with
few IP addresses. This case is an extreme one showing very few clusters and highlight-
ing only one score greatly higher than others (the second index on x-axis). Therefore,
this case was chosen in the end of the clustering process. The selected cluster contains
100 different flow tuples from 52 distinct IP addresses under University of Twente do-
main, which represent the list of malicious hosts obtained in the step 7.
4.2 Complexity
The core construction of initial clusters is quadratic (section 3.2) due to the calculation
of all pairwise distances. To avoid this drawback, some samples (potential spammers)
are selected in a linear time (33k iterations) regarding the number of SMTP flows (sec-
tion 3.1). Then, the two selected hosts coverages 143k records. It leads to 143k2 cal-
culations for the initial clustering. Then, 143k× 24M operations are necessary for the
cluster extension which represent around 0.6% if no prior selection and clustering were
performed (24M2 iterations to compute all pair-wise distance). Finally, the scoring pro-
cess has to deal with about 3,000,000 points in the worst case (the biggest cluster). The
complexity of our scoring method is linear whereas traditional approaches are quadratic
(section 3.4). So, the number of iterations is also divided by 3M.
Even our approach has similarities with other ones [8], we have really focus on
reducing the running time by optimizing the algorithms. This is particularly important
when monitoring large networks.
4.3 Validation and Egress Traffic filtering
When evaluating the performance of techniques for intrusion detection, researches usu-
ally rely on labeled datasets, which contains meta-information about the attacks ob-
served. Usually such kind of datasets are available in pcap format, i.e., complete net-
work traces. Since our technique is based on flow records instead, we could not benefit
from these datasets. Even though Sperotto et al. [12] have provided the first labeled
dataset for flow-based intrusion detection, this could not be used in our research, since
in this work we evaluate egress traffic instead. More than that, their dataset is based on
a single host – which is not suitable for our clustering technique. Due to that, we have
to check manually the flow records associated to the 52 malicious hosts obtained as a
result of our detection technique to try to find whether malicious behavior was observed
or not. Some interesting findings were obtained:
– One desktop PC was found having 7151 SMTP flows to 245 different mail servers
located in many different countries for a 24 hours period. Since flows contain only
a summary of a connection, we cannot tell how many messages are sent per flow.
Assuming, in this case, that only one message was sent per flow, we have a total
of almost 5 mail messages send per second, which is very unusual for a desktop.
Figure 4 shows the number of SMTP flows to each mail server. Moreover, the same
machine have contacted two different IRC servers, in a total of 1193 flows. Such
behavior is typical for a machine belonging to a spamming IRC botnet.
– One Windows desktop found running a non-authorized service on UDP and TCP
port 56168. After checking with the Security Administrator at UT, it was found
that this machine was the desktop of a professor that was unaware of it. He was
promptly notified. In this two hour period, this machine has been contacted by
72579 different IP addresses on the aforementioned port, transmitting more than
66MB of data. Also, a hidden web server was found on this machine, which was
contacted by 353 different hosts. We have extended the analysis for this machine
and found out that 330,925 different IP addresses reached it on April 10th 2010 – a
very suspicious behavior for a desktop. We suspect this machine may be working as
a botmaster (remotely controlled) or as a coordination point for botnets like those
used by Storm [13].
– Another computer on the wireless network – which, by definition, should not run
any services – was found running a suspicious service on port 23352, for TCP and
UDP (mostly UDP). In this 2 hours period, the machine was contacted by 96.609
different hosts from various countries. Since this machine is mobile, we could not
reach it by the time of the analysis. For this period, 19GB of data was transfered to
these different hosts.
– One machine from the student network was also running a suspicious service on
UDP and TCP port 32861, which was contacted by 77,434 different hosts in two
hours. 67 MB of data were transfered in this case.
– Another host was found running a suspicious service on TCP and UDP port 39563,
contacted by 79824 distinct IP addresses from various locations. 66 MB of data
were transfered in this two hours.
Even though the validation process was manually and not extensively executed, this
results shows that our approach was able to detect the involved hosts based on very
small list of potential suspect addresses – 2 spamming hosts detected before apply-
ing clustering. By blocking such malicious hosts in our domain (“cleaning our houses
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Fig. 4: Number of flows from one suspicious host to different mail servers
first”), we can avoid their malicious activities to reach the Internet. Some estimates can
be calculated from blocking malicious hosts: assuming that every flow of the spamming
bot we found represents a single spam, by blocking only this host, we could avoid 7151
spam messages to reach the Internet. If the botnet this host is part has a size of 100k
bots, by dismantling it (looking at the IRC traffic) we could potentially avoid 715 mil-
lions spam messages to reach the Internet in a single day. That represents 878.2 GB of
data by extrapolating the monitored metrics. The same reasoning can be extended to
other machines that our previous analysis has figured out and as well to other source
of network attacks, such as DDoS. The more egress filtering is employed by ISPs and
businesses, the more malicious traffic can be blocked from the Internet.
5 Related Work
Van Eeten et al. [3] have evaluated a dataset of 63 billion spam messages obtained
between 2005 and 2008. By analyzing the IP addresses of the sources, they observed
that 10 ISPs account for 30% of unique IP addresses sending spam worldwide, 50 ISPs
for half of all sources. Even though this study was performed on a not up-to-date data
set, it suggests the benefits that can be achieved by filtering egress traffic of few ISPs.
In another work, de Vries et al. [4] have shown that egress mail traffic can be easily
filtered using lightweight techniques. However, in this work the authors rely on the
message’s content when filtering the traffic. A survey on flow-based intrusion detection,
on the hand, was presented by Sperotto et. al [6]. Differently from this work, the authors
focus on detecting malicious host on the Internet, while in this work we target intra-
domain malicious hosts.
Deploying a honeypot to be infected by a bot software is usually a direct and con-
venient way to study a botnet but it may not be efficient [14]. Tracking infected hosts
can also be done by monitoring DNS requests of the machines [15] especially for an
IRC botnet. A lot of techniques detect a botnet relying on the malicious activities such
as scanning or denial of service attacks [16]. In our approach, we leverage the same
knowledge but then we improve the botnet detection by detecting common communica-
tion patterns of the C&C channel. P2P botnets are usually detected by active techniques
such as in [17]. Graph algorithms may be also employed to infer interesting properties
of bots relationships [18].
In this work, we have conducted a study case on spamming hosts. We based our
work on two works by Gu et. al [8] [19]. In our work, we correlate malicious activities
with C&C detected communication patterns. The main difference between BotMiner
[8] and our approach is that we apply clustering only to a small subset of Netflows
resulting in clusters which are extended afterwards to all Netflows. It leads to a huge
improvement of the complexity and so the running time.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we propose a new paradigm to be employed by ISPs and businesses for
protecting their own networks. Instead of solely filter ingress traffic, in this work we
investigate the benefits that can be achieved by filtering egress traffic as well (clean-
ing our own house first). The motivation is that if such policy is widely adopted, the
overall amount of malicious traffic on the Internet could be significantly reduced. That
would ultimately lead to saving considerable amounts of money and computer/network
resources.
Therefore, in this paper we investigated the following research question: what can
be achieved by filtering egress traffic from a particular domain? To answer this ques-
tion, we have refined clustering techniques to analyze flow records from the University
of Twente. As our results have shown, we were able to detect many suspect hosts. By
detecting and blocking one of these hosts, for example, we could have been able to
avoid that 7151 spam messages could reach the Internet in first place. The same rea-
soning applies to the other suspecious hosts. More than that, our results have shown
that such filtering could help to detect and dismantle botnet operations outside the mon-
itored domain. The benefits of egress filtering would only increase as more ISPs and
businesses adopt it as a common practice.
As future work, we intend to combine surpervised detection methods (since they are
more efficient to detect known attacks) with clustering analysis. The idea is to combine
both methods for improving the detection accuracy in various scenarios. Finally, we
plan to obtain an economic model in order to estimate how much can be saved by
filtering egress traffic.
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